12.1 The structure of household consumption sets and preferences

Households are elements of the finite set H numbered  $1, 2, \ldots, \#H$ . A household  $i \in H$  will be characterized by its possible consumption set  $X^i \subseteq \mathbf{R}^N_+$ , its preferences  $\succeq_i$ , and its endowment  $r^i \in \mathbf{R}^N_+$ . We will soon move to using a utility function  $u^i(\cdot)$  to represent  $\succeq_i$ .

#### 12.2 Consumption sets

(C.I)  $X^i$  is closed and nonempty.

(C.II)  $X^i \subseteq \mathbf{R}^N_+$ .  $X^i$  is unbounded above, that is, for any  $x \in X^i$  there is  $y \in X^i$  so that y > x, that is, for  $n = 1, 2, ..., N, y_n \ge x_n$  and  $y \ne x$ . (C.III)  $X^i$  is convex.

 $X = \sum_{i \in H} X^i.$ 

#### 12.2.1 Preferences

Each household  $i \in H$  has a preference quasi-ordering on  $X^i$ , denoted  $\succeq_i$ . For typical  $x, y \in X^i$ , " $x \succeq_i y$ " is read "x is preferred or indifferent to y (according to i)." We introduce the following terminology:

If  $x \succeq_i y$  and  $y \succeq_i x$  then  $x \sim_i y$  ("x is indifferent to y"),

If  $x \succeq_i y$  but not  $y \succeq_i x$  then  $x \succ_i y$  ("x is strictly preferred to y").

We will assume  $\succeq_i$  to be complete on  $X^i$ , that is, any two elements of  $X^i$  are comparable under  $\succeq_i$ . For all  $x, y \in X^i, x \succeq_i y$ , or  $y \succeq_i x$  (or both). Since we take  $\succeq_i$  to be a quasi-ordering,  $\succeq_i$  is assumed to be transitive and reflexive.

The conventional alternative to describing the quasi-ordering  $\succeq_i$  is to assume the presence of a utility function  $u^i(x)$  so that  $x \succeq_i y$  if and only if  $u^i(x) \ge u^i(y)$ . We will show below that the utility function can be derived from the quasi-ordering. Readers who prefer the utility function formulation may use it at will. Just read  $u^i(x) \ge u^i(y)$  wherever you see  $x \succeq_i y$ .

## 12.2.2 Non-Satiation

(C.IV) (Non-Satiation) Let  $x \in X^i$ . Then there is  $y \in X^i$  so that  $y \succ_i x$ .

# 12.2.3 Continuity

We now introduce the principal technical assumption on preferences, the assumption of continuity.

(C.V) (Continuity) For every 
$$x^{\circ} \in X^{i}$$
, the sets  
 $A^{i}(x^{\circ}) = \{x \mid x \in X^{i}, x \succeq_{i} x^{\circ}\}$  and  
 $G^{i}(x^{\circ}) = \{x \mid x \in X^{i}, x^{\circ} \succeq_{i} x\}$  are closed.

Note that this assumption represents precisely what we would expect from a continuous utility function: that the inverse images of the closed sets [0, a] and  $[a, +\infty)$  are closed, where  $a = u^i(x^\circ)$ .

The following example represents an otherwise well-behaved preference ordering that is not continuous.

Example 12.1 (Lexicographic preferences) The lexicographic (dictionary-like) ordering on  $\mathbf{R}^N$  (let's denote it  $\succeq_L$ ) is described in the following way. Let

 $\mathbf{2}$ 

12.2 Consumption sets

$$x = (x_1, x_2, \dots, x_N)$$
 and  $y = (y_1, y_2, \dots, y_N)$ .  
 $x \succ_L y \text{if } x_1 > y_1, \text{ or}$   
if  $x_1 = y_1$  and  $x_2 > y_2, \text{ or}$   
if  $x_1 = y_1, x_2 = y_2$ , and  $x_3 > y_3$ , and so forth  $\dots$   
 $x \sim_L y \text{if } x = y.$ 

 $\succeq_L$  fulfills non-satiation, trivially fulfills strict convexity (C.VI(SC), introduced below), but does not fulfill continuity (C.V).

## 12.2.4 Attainable Consumption

Definition x is an **attainable** consumption if  $y + r \ge x \ge 0$ , where  $y \in \mathcal{Y}$  and  $r \in \mathbf{R}^N_+$  is the economy's initial resource endowment, so that y is an attainable production plan.

Note that the set of attainable consumptions is bounded under P.VI.

12.2.5 Convexity of preferences

- (C.VI)(C) (Convexity of Preferences)  $x \succ_i y$  implies  $((1 \alpha)x + \alpha y) \succ_i y$ , for  $0 < \alpha < 1$ .
- (C.VI)(SC) (Strict Convexity of Preferences): Let  $x \succeq_i y$ , (note that this includes  $x \sim_i y$ ),  $x \neq y$ , and let  $0 < \alpha < 1$ . Then  $\alpha x + (1 \alpha)y \succ_i y$ .

Equivalently, if preferences are characterized by a utility function  $u^i(\cdot)$ , then we can state C.VI(SC) as

$$u^{i}(x) \ge u^{i}(y), x \ne y$$
, implies  $u^{i}[\alpha x + (1 - \alpha)y] > u^{i}(y)$ .

An immediate consequence of C.VI(C) is that  $A^i(x^\circ)$  is convex for every  $x^\circ \in X^i$ .

3

4

#### Lecture Notes for February 8, 10, 13: Households

12.3 Representation of  $\succeq_i:$  Existence of a continuous utility function

Definition Let  $u^i: X^i \to \mathbf{R}$ .  $u^i(\cdot)$  is a utility function that **represents** the preference ordering  $\succeq_i$  if for all  $x, y \in X^i$ ,  $u^i(x) \ge u^i(y)$  if and only if  $x \succeq_i y$ . This implies that  $u^i(x) > u^i(y)$  if and only if  $x \succ_i y$ .

12.3.1 Weak Conditions for Existence of a Continuous Utility Function

Theorem 12.1 Let  $\succeq_i, X^i$ , fulfill C.I, C.II, C.III, C.V. Then there is  $u^i : X^i \to \mathbb{R}, u^i(\cdot)$  continuous on  $X^i$ , so that  $u^i(\cdot)$  is a utility function representing  $\succeq_i$ .

Proof See Debreu (1959, Section 4.6) or Debreu (1954). QED

12.3.2 Construction of a continuous utility function

Shortcut: use weak desirability,  $X^i = R^N_+$  and a 45° line.

12.4 Choice and boundedness of budget sets,  $\tilde{B}^{i}(p)$ 

Choose  $c \in \mathbf{R}_+$  so that |x| < c (a strict inequality) for all attainable consumptions x. Choose c sufficiently large that  $X^i \cap \{x \mid x \in \mathbf{R}^N, c > |x|\} \neq \phi$ ;

$$\tilde{B}^i(p) = \{x \mid x \in \mathbf{R}^N, p \cdot x \le \tilde{M}^i(p)\} \cap \{x \mid |x| \le c\}.$$

$$\tilde{D}^{i}(p) \equiv \{x \mid x \in \tilde{B}^{i}(p) \cap X^{i}, x \succeq_{i} y \text{ for all } y \in \tilde{B}^{i}(p) \cap X^{i}\} \\ \equiv \{x \mid x \in \tilde{B}^{i}(p) \cap X^{i}, x \text{ maximizes } u^{i}(y) \text{ for all } y \in \tilde{B}^{i}(p) \cap X^{i}\}\$$

To characterize market demand let

$$\tilde{D}(p) = \sum_{i \in H} \tilde{D}^i(p).$$

12.4 Choice and boundedness of budget sets,  $\tilde{B}^i(p)$ 

Lemma 12.1  $\tilde{B}^i(p)$  is a closed set.

We will restrict attention to models where  $\tilde{M}^i(p)$  is homogeneous of degree one, that is, where  $\tilde{M}^i(\lambda p) = \lambda \tilde{M}^i(p)$ . It is immediate then that  $\tilde{B}^i(p)$  is homogeneous of degree zero.

Lemma 12.2 Let  $\tilde{M}^i(p)$  be homogeneous of degree 1. Let  $\tilde{B}^i(p)$  and  $\tilde{D}^i(p) \neq \emptyset$ . Then  $\tilde{B}^i(p)$  and  $\tilde{D}^i(p)$  are homogeneous of degree 0.

$$P \equiv \left\{ p \mid p \in \mathbf{R}^{N}, p_{n} \ge 0, n = 1, 2, 3, \dots, N, \sum_{n=1}^{N} p_{n} = 1 \right\}.$$

## 12.4.1 Adequacy of income

Continuity of demand behavior may require sufficient income for the household to keep the budget set from coinciding with the boundary of  $X^i$ .

(C.VII) For all  $i \in H$ ,  $\tilde{M}^i(p) > \inf_{x \in X^i \cap \{x \mid |x| \le c\}} p \cdot x$  for all  $p \in P$ .

The example below demonstrates that when (C.VII) is not fulfilled, demand behavior may be discontinuous.

Example 12.2 [The Arrow Corner]

$$X^{i} = \mathbf{R}_{+}^{2},$$
  

$$r^{i} = (1, 0),$$
  

$$\tilde{M}^{i}(p) = p \cdot r^{i}.$$

Let  $p^{\circ} = (0, 1)$ . Then

$$\tilde{B}^{i}(p^{\circ}) \cap X^{i} = \{(x, y) \mid c \ge x \ge 0, y = 0\},\$$

the truncated nonnegative x axis. Consider the sequence  $p^{\nu} = (1/\nu, 1 - 1/\nu)$ .

5

 $p^{\nu} \rightarrow p^{\circ}$ . We have

$$\tilde{B}^{i}(p^{\nu}) \cap X^{i} = \left\{ (x, y) \mid p^{\nu} \cdot (x, y) \le \frac{1}{\nu}, (x, y) \ge 0, c \ge |(x, y)| \ge 0 \right\},$$

 $(c,0) \in \tilde{B}^i(p^\circ)$ , but there is no sequence  $(x^{\nu}, y^{\nu}) \in \tilde{B}^i(p^{\nu})$  so that  $(x^{\nu}, y^{\nu}) \to (c,0)$ . On the contrary, for any sequence  $(x^{\nu}, y^{\nu}) \in \tilde{B}^i(p^{\nu})$  so that  $(x^{\nu}, y^{\nu}) = \tilde{D}^i(p^{\nu}), (x^{\nu}, y^{\nu})$  will converge to some  $(x^*, 0)$ , where  $0 \leq x^* \leq 1$ . For suitably chosen  $\succeq_i$ , we may have  $(c,0) = \tilde{D}^i(p^\circ)$ . Hence  $\tilde{D}^i(p)$  need not be continuous at  $p^\circ$ . This completes the example.

## 12.5 Demand behavior under strict convexity

Theorem 12.2 Assume C.I–C.V, C.VI(SC), and C.VII. Let  $\tilde{M}^i(p)$  be a continuous function for all  $p \in P$ . Then  $\tilde{D}^i(p)$  is a well-defined, point-valued, continuous function for all  $p \in P$ .

Proving well-defined, point-valued, is easy. Proving continuity is hard, because the proof necessarily involves C.VII. Continuity is proved by contradiction; we know the proof is going to be tricky.

Proof  $\tilde{B}^i(p) \cap X^i$  is the intersection of the closed set  $\{x \mid p \cdot x \leq \tilde{M}^i(p)\}$  with the compact set  $\{x \mid |x| \leq c\}$  and the closed set  $X^i$ . Hence it is compact. It is nonempty by C.VII. Because  $\tilde{D}^i(p)$  is characterized by the maximization of a continuous function,  $u^i(\cdot)$ , on this compact nonempty set, there is a well-defined maximum value,  $u^* = u^i(x^*)$ , where  $x^*$  is the utility-optimizing value of x in  $\tilde{B}^i(p) \cap X^i$ . We must show that  $x^*$  is unique for each  $p \in P$  and that  $x^*$  is a continuous function of p.

We will now demonstrate that uniqueness follows from strict convexity of preferences (C.VI(SC)). Suppose there is  $x' \in \tilde{B}^i(p) \cap X^i, x' \neq x^*, x' \sim_i x^*$ . We must show that this leads to a contradiction. But now consider a convex

 $\mathbf{6}$ 

combination of x' and  $x^*$ . Choose  $0 < \alpha < 1$ . The point  $\alpha x' + (1 - \alpha)x^* \in \tilde{B}^i(p) \cap X^i$  by convexity of  $X^i$  and  $\tilde{B}^i(p)$ . But C.VI(SC), strict convexity of preferences, implies that  $[\alpha x' + (1 - \alpha)x^*] \succ_i x' \sim_i x^*$ . This is a contradiction, since  $x^*$  and x' are elements of  $\tilde{D}^i(p)$ . Hence  $x^*$  is the unique element of  $\tilde{D}^i(p)$ . We can now, without loss of generality, refer to  $\tilde{D}^i(p)$  as a (point-valued) function.

To demonstrate continuity, let  $p^{\nu} \in P$ ,  $\nu = 1, 2, 3, \ldots, p^{\nu} \to p^{\circ}$ . We must show that  $\tilde{D}^{i}(p^{\nu}) \to \tilde{D}^{i}(p^{\circ})$ .  $\tilde{D}^{i}(p^{\nu})$  is a sequence in a compact set. Without loss of generality take a convergent subsequence,  $\tilde{D}^{i}(p^{\nu}) \to x^{\circ}$ . We must show that  $x^{\circ} = \tilde{D}^{i}(p^{\circ})$ . We will use a proof by contradiction.

Define

$$\hat{x} = \underset{x \in X^{i} \cap \{y | y \in \mathbf{R}^{N}, c \ge |y|\}}{\arg \min} p^{\circ} \cdot x.$$

The expression " $\hat{x} = \arg \min_{x \in X^i \cap \{y | y \in \mathbf{R}^N, c \ge |y|\}} p^{\circ} \cdot x$ " defines  $\hat{x}$  as the minimizer of  $p^{\circ} \cdot x$  in the domain  $X^i \cap \{y | y \in \mathbf{R}^N, c \ge |y|\}$ .  $\hat{x}$  is well defined (though it may not be unique) since it represents a minimum of a continuous function taken over a compact domain.

Now consider two cases. In each case we will construct a sequence  $w^{\nu}$  in  $X^i \cap \{y \mid y \in \mathbf{R}^N, c \ge |y|\}.$ 

Case 1: If  $p^{\circ} \cdot \tilde{D}^{i}(p^{\circ}) < \tilde{M}^{i}(p^{\circ})$  for  $\nu$  large  $p^{\nu} \cdot \tilde{D}^{i}(p^{\circ}) < \tilde{M}^{i}(p^{\nu})$ . Then let  $w^{\nu} = D^{i}(p^{\circ})$ .

Case 2: If  $p^{\circ} \cdot \tilde{D}^i(p^{\circ}) = \tilde{M}^i(p^{\circ})$  then by (C.VII)  $p^{\circ} \cdot \tilde{D}^i(p^{\circ}) > p^{\circ} \cdot \hat{x}$ . Let

$$\alpha^{\nu} = \min \Big[ 1, \frac{M^{i}(p^{\nu}) - p^{\nu} \cdot \hat{x}}{p^{\nu} \cdot (\tilde{D}^{i}(p^{\circ}) - \hat{x})} \Big].$$

For  $\nu$  large, the denominator is positive,  $\alpha^{\nu}$  is well defined (this is where C.VII enters the proof), and  $0 \leq \alpha^{\nu} \leq 1$ . Let  $w^{\nu} = (1 - \alpha^{\nu})\hat{x} + \alpha^{\nu}\tilde{D}^{i}(p^{\circ})$ .

Note that  $\tilde{M}^i(p)$  is continuous in p. The fraction in the definition of  $\alpha^{\nu}$  is the proportion of the move from  $\hat{x}$  to  $\tilde{D}^i(p^{\circ})$  that the household can afford at prices  $p^{\nu}$ . As  $\nu$  becomes large, the proportion approaches or exceeds unity.

Then in both Case 1 and Case 2,  $w^{\nu} \to \tilde{D}^{i}(p^{\circ})$  and  $w^{\nu} \in \tilde{B}^{i}(p^{\nu}) \cap X^{i}$ . Suppose, contrary to the theorem,  $x^{\circ} \neq \tilde{D}^{i}(p^{\circ})$ . Then  $u^{i}(x^{\circ}) < u^{i}(\tilde{D}^{i}(p^{\circ}))$ . But  $u^{i}$  is continuous, so  $u^{i}(\tilde{D}^{i}(p^{\nu}) \to u^{i}(x^{\circ})$  and  $u^{i}(w^{\nu}) \to u^{i}(\tilde{D}^{i}(p^{\circ}))$ . Thus, for  $\nu$  large,  $u^{i}(w^{\nu}) > u^{i}(\tilde{D}^{i}(p^{\nu}))$ . But this is a contradiction, since  $\tilde{D}^{i}(p^{\nu})$ maximizes  $u^{i}(\cdot)$  in  $\tilde{B}^{i}(p^{\nu}) \cap X^{i}$ . The contradiction proves the result. This completes the demonstration of continuity. QED

Theorem 12.2 gives a family of sufficient conditions for demand behavior of the household to be very well behaved. It will be a continuous (pointvalued) function of prices if preferences are continuous and strictly convex and if income is a continuous function of prices and sufficiently positive.

What will household spending patterns look like? What is the value of household expenditures,  $p \cdot \tilde{D}^i(p)$ ? There are two significant constraints on  $p \cdot \tilde{D}^i(p)$ , budget and length:  $p \cdot \tilde{D}^i(p) \leq \tilde{M}^i(p)$  and  $|\tilde{D}^i(p)| \leq c$ . In addition, of course,  $\tilde{D}^i(p)$  must optimize consumption choice with regard to preferences  $\succeq_i$  or equivalently with regard to the utility function  $u^i(\cdot)$ . We have enough structure on preferences and the budget set to actually say a fair amount about the character of spending and where  $\tilde{D}^i(p)$  is located. This is embodied in

Lemma 12.3 Assume C.I–C.V, C.VI(C), and C.VII. Then  $p \cdot \tilde{D}^i(p) \leq \tilde{M}^i(p)$ . Further, if  $p \cdot \tilde{D}^i(p) < \tilde{M}^i(p)$  then  $|\tilde{D}^i(p)| = c$ .

Proof  $\tilde{D}^i(p) \in \tilde{B}^i(p)$  by definition. However, that ensures  $p \cdot \tilde{D}^i(p) \leq \tilde{M}^i(p)$ and hence the weak inequality surely holds. Suppose, however,  $p \cdot \tilde{D}^i(p) < \tilde{D}^i(p)$ 

8

 $\tilde{M}^{i}(p)$  and  $|\tilde{D}^{i}(p)| < c$ . We wish to show that this leads to a contradiction. Recall C.IV (Non-Satiation) and C.VI(C) (Convexity). By C.IV there is  $w^{*} \in X^{i}$  so that  $w^{*} \succ_{i} \tilde{D}^{i}(p)$ . Clearly,  $w^{*} \notin \tilde{B}^{i}(p)$  so one (or both) of two conditions holds: (a)  $p \cdot w^{*} > \tilde{M}^{i}(p)$ , (b)  $|w^{*}| > c$ .

Set  $w' = \alpha w^* + (1 - \alpha) \tilde{D}^i(p)$ . There is an  $\alpha(1 > \alpha > 0)$  sufficiently small so that  $p \cdot w' \leq \tilde{M}^i(p)$  and  $|w'| \leq c$ . Thus  $w' \in \tilde{B}^i(p)$ . Now  $w' \succ_i \tilde{D}^i(p)$  by C.VI(C), which is a contradiction since  $\tilde{D}^i(p)$  is the preference optimizer in  $\tilde{B}^i(p)$ . The contradiction shows that we cannot have both  $p \cdot \tilde{D}^i(p) < \tilde{M}^i(p)$ and  $|\tilde{D}^i(p)| < c$ . Hence, if the first inequality holds, we must have  $|\tilde{D}^i(p)| = c$ . QED