

What follows is an annotated bibliography for the December lectures.

## References

- [1] David Austen-Smith and Jeffrey S. Banks. Information aggregation, rationality, and the condorcet jury theorem. *American Political Science Review*, 90:34–45, 1996.  
[Observes that Condorcet Jury Theorem does not hold with strategic voter. Distinguishes informative, naive, and strategic voting. Straightforward argument.]
- [2] David Austen-Smith and Tim Feddersen. Deliberation and voting rules. Technical report, Northwestern University, November 2002.  
[Shows in a very special model different ways in which full information revelation is less likely under unanimity than majority rule models with deliberation. The paper is long. The arguments are intricate but not general.]
- [3] David Austin-Smith and Tim Feddersen. Deliberation, unanimity rule and majority rule. Technical report, Northwestern University, August 2004.  
[A short paper that shows, roughly, if full disclosure during deliberation followed by unanimous voting is possible if and only if preferences are “minimally diverse.” More general voting environment than is standard. Note: minimal diversity assumption is strong.]
- [4] Peter J. Coughlan. In defense of unanimous jury verdicts: Mistrials, communication, and strategic voting. *The American Political Science Review*, 94(2):375–393, June 2000.  
[Two observations: There are no problems with getting the right answer in voting models with homogeneous preferences if deliberation is possible. (This result is trivial, but reminds us some of the insights from strategic voting literature are more interesting as technical insights than as substantive observations.) Second, the paper notes that informative voting under unanimity is “more likely” to be an equilibrium if retrials are necessary following a non-unanimous vote.]
- [5] Timothy J. Feddersen and Wolfgang Pesendorfer. The swing voter’s curse. *American Economic Review*, 86(3):408–424, June 1996.  
[Uncertainty about the population of voters makes uninformed voters prefer to abstain. Nevertheless, full information equivalence under strategic voting.]
- [6] Timothy Feddersen and Wolfgang Pesendorfer. Voting behavior and information aggregation in elections with private information. *Econometrica*, 65(5):1029–1058, September 1997.  
[Fancier version of previous paper.]

- [7] Timothy Feddersen and Wolfgang Pesendorfer. Convicting the innocent: the inferiority of unanimous jury verdicts under strategic voting. *The American Political Science Review*, 92(1):23–35, March 1998.  
[Strategic voting under unanimous rule may lead to too many convictions.]
- [8] Hans Gersbach Information efficiency and majority decisions *Social Choice and Welfare*, 12:363-370, 1995.  
[Investigation of incentives to gather information in a binary outcome, majority voting environment. Gersbach has a series of papers that illustrate the welfare implications of the possibility of acquiring information either individually or as a group in the binary outcome, majority voting framework.]
- [9] Dino Gerardi and Leeat Yariv. Deliberative voting. *Journal of Economic Theory*, forthcoming.  
[All non-unanimous voting rules are equivalent in game in voting follows one round of communication. Demonstrates that equilibria can be strange in voting models.]
- [10] Jean-François Laslier and Jörgen W. Weibull. Providing Incentives for Informative Voting working paper, Ecole Polytechnique and Stockholm School of Economics, December 2006.  
[Shows that one can regain sincere voting in large populations by perturbing preferences. Underlying idea similar to Meirowitz, but context is different.]
- [11] Andrew McLennan. Consequences of the condorcet jury theorem for beneficial information aggregation by rational agents. *The American Political Science Review*, 92(2):413–418, June 1998.  
[General version of straightforward observation that in common-interest games strategic voting is consistent with efficiency.]
- [12] Adam Meirowitz. Designing institutions to aggregate preferences and information. working paper, Princeton University, November 2005.  
[Variation of 2006 paper. It contains results on effectiveness of deliberation as a function of group size.]
- [13] Adam Meirowitz. In defense of exclusionary deliberation: communication and voting In defense of exclusionary deliberation: communication and voting with private beliefs and values. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, forthcoming.  
[Several ways to modify voting environment to obtain or regain full revelation in deliberative voting model.]