## Simple Math: Matching Problems

Exercise 1 Construct an example in which there is more than one stable matching. (You only need two boys and two girls to do this.)

Exercise 2 Suppose that the boys all have different favorite girls. How many steps does it take for the algorithm to converge?

Exercise 3 Suppose that the boys have identical preferences. How many steps does it take for the algorithm to converge?

Exercise 4 Suppose preferences are given by the following tables:

| BOY | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Adam | Beth | Amy | Diane | Ellen | Cara |
| Bill | Diane | Beth | Amy | Cara | Ellen |
| Carl | Beth | Ellen | Cara | Diane | Amy |
| Dan | Amy | Diane | Cara | Beth | Ellen |
| Eric | Beth | Diane | Amy | Ellen | Cara |

Boys' Preferences

| GIRL | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Amy | Eric | Adam | Bill | Dan | Carl |
| Beth | Carl | Bill | Dan | Adam | Eric |
| Cara | Bill | Carl | Dan | Eric | Adam |
| Diane | Adam | Eric | Dan | Carl | Bill |
| Ellen | Dan | Bill | Eric | Carl | Adam |

Girls' Preferences
Find a stable matching using the Gale-Shapley algorithm with boys making proposals. Find a stable matching using the Gale-Shapley algorithm with girls making proposals.

Exercise 5 This exercise shows that stable matchings need not exist if there are not "two sides." Consider the following "roommate" problem. There are four people, Pat, Chris, Dana, and Leslie. They must pair off (each pair will share a two-bed suite). Each has preferences over which of the others they would prefer to have as a roommate. The preferences are:

Leslie: Pat $\succ$ Chris $\succ$ Dana
Chris: Leslie $\succ$ Pat $\succ$ Dana
Pat: Chris $\succ$ Leslie $\succ$ Dana
Dana: Chris $\succ$ Leslie $\succ$ Pat
Show that no stable matching exists. (That is, no matter who you put together, they will always be two potential roommates who are not matched, but prefer each other to their current roommate.)

