

Jacob S. LaRiviere

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DATE OF BIRTH: 5/20/1981

SEX: M

CITIZENSHIP: USA

EDUCATION:

University of California, Berkeley
B.A. in Economics, 2003

University of California, San Diego
M.A. in Economics, 2006
Ph.D. in Economics, 2010 (expected)

Thesis Title: *Optimal Policy Structure in Natural Resource Economics*

THESIS COMMITTEE REFERENCES:

Richard Carson (chair)
Department of Economics
9500 Gilman Dr.
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DESIRED TEACHING AND RESEARCH:

Primary Fields: Environmental and Natural Resource Economics

Secondary Fields: Industrial Organization, Labor Economics, Econometrics

TEACHING EXPERIENCE:

9/2008-current Lecturer, University of California, San Diego
Principles of Macroeconomics, International Monetary Economics

8/2007-12/2008 Lecturer, California State University, San Marcos
Principles of Macroeconomics, International Monetary Economics

1/2004-current Teaching Assistant, University of California, San Diego

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Graduate Courses:

Advanced Econometrics, School of International Relations and Pacific Studies
Microeconomics, Rady School of Management

Undergraduate Courses:

Industrial Organization, Environmental Economics, Econometrics Sequence,
Intermediate Microeconomics and Macroeconomics, Ocean Resource Economics,
Conservation Economics, Financial Investments.

RELEVANT POSITIONS HELD:

2008-current Staff Economist, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

HONORS, SCHOLARSHIPS, AND FELLOWSHIPS:

2005 Graduate Student Fellow, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

WORKING PAPER:

Profit Sharing in Natural Resource Industries: Implications and Optimal Management

(Job Market Paper)

In renewable resource industries, labor is commonly paid with a share of the harvested resource rather than with a per unit-of-effort wage. Share cropping in agriculture is one well-known example and entitlement of the crew to a share of the revenue from the sale of the catch is almost universal among commercial fishing fleets. This paper shows that sharing arrangements have substantial implications for the industry's profits, optimal resource management, and the resource's ecological state. Effectively, sharing agreements can interact with fluctuations in natural capital to cause inefficient investment levels and skew industry rents toward labor. As a consequence, optimal regulatory policy for such industries must account for the implications of such sharing arrangements. The model demonstrates why management tools like individual transferable quotas in fisheries, have had unexpected ecological benefits in terms of increasing and stabilizing fishery stocks. Finally, the paper provides an illustrative example using the US Pacific albacore fishery.

RESEARCH IN PROGRESS

The Structure of Energy-Related Research Joint Ventures Between Government and Industry

Most developed countries fund national laboratories or universities to perform energy-related research in conjunction with private industries. For example, the U.S. Department of Energy's national labs are mandated to perform research in conjunction with U.S. industry aimed at increasing energy efficiency. This paper extends the research joint venture (RJV) literature to cover these government funded energy-related collaborations. It uses a game theoretic framework to explain why a RJV sponsored by a national research lab will tend to have significantly more participants than a private RJV. The analysis shows the composition of RJV members will also tend to be different due to the nature of the RJV projects chosen. The model predicts that regulatory capture is likely to occur from firms with well-established technologies. In essence, the typical government funded RJV rules encourage choosing to work on projects that result in marginal improvements to the products of a set of larger firms with relatively mature technologies. Because such an RJV can influence relative advantage, it can harm firms with emerging technologies that potentially result in considerable energy savings if implemented.

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Optimal Pollution Control and Scientific Research with Structural Uncertainty
Joint with Richard Carson

The standard economic theory of pollution control is premised on the assumption that all of the sources of a particular pollutant are known. This assumption is manifestly false. In Los Angeles, the most studied location in the world for air pollution, it was recently discovered that over 10% of several regulated air pollutants were coming from a previously unknown source, large ships in the Los Angeles Harbor. The science of greenhouse gases presents a seemingly endless stream of such discoveries. The fundamental source of the problem is the ability to observe pollution for specific sources, the ability to measure ambient quality, and the use of scientific models to calibrate the two. We consider two cases, the first where total emissions are known but not all of the individual sources and the second where total emissions are not known. This paper uses a Bayesian learning framework to explicitly model scientific uncertainty over emissions and their relationship to ambient quality. We show that a risk neutral regulator over-regulates known sources if uncertainty is not explicitly modeled while a risk averse regulator can under-regulate. When scientific progress is endogenized, the model provides an optimal R&D path that accounts for the possibility of finding new pollution sources with lower control costs.

Biofuel Mandates: Community Level Socioeconomic and Land Use Impacts in the Pacific Northwest
Joint with OV Livingston, RS Butner, DM Anderson.

Biofuel mandates can have a significant effect on agricultural land use decisions (Bento and Landry 2009). This paper exploits a unique data set to analyze the impacts of changes in state and national biofuel mandates on agricultural land use decisions in the Pacific Northwest. This paper examines the effect of mandates on cellulosic biofuels, such as those derived from switchgrasses, on a farmer's discrete choice between type of crop and on the decision to covert "marginal" land into active farmland. Changes in land use decisions are found to be heavily dependent on three factors: yields in switchgrass production, variation in transportation costs to cellulosic biofuel processing plants, and changing biofuel prices due to different government mandates.

OTHER WORK:

Contributing author, "The San Diego Foundation Regional Focus 2050 Study: Climate Change Related Impacts in the San Diego Region by 2050." The San Diego Foundation, 2008. San Diego, CA.

PROFESSIONAL PRESENTATIONS:

2008 European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists 16th Annual Conference, Gothenburg, Sweden. "Fishermen Remuneration Regime Effects on Optimal Fleet Capacity."

SEMINAR AND WORKSHOP PRESENTATIONS:

2009 University of South Carolina Moore School of Business, Columbia SC.
11th Annual University of Colorado Environmental and Resource Economics Workshop, Vail, CO.
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Richland, WA.
University of California at San Diego Lunch Seminar, La Jolla, CA

2008 Workshop for Technical Change in Renewable Resource Economics, Helsingor, Denmark.

PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS:

AEA, AERE, UCSD Center for Environmental Economics.