Optimally empty promises and endogenous supervision
With Kareen Rozen
Abstract: We study optimal contracting in teams with peer monitoring and moral hazard, featuring stylized aspects of production environments with complex tasks. Agents have many opportunities to shirk, task-level monitoring is needed to provide useful incentives, and because it is difficult to write individual performance into formal contracts, incentives are provided informally, using wasteful sanctions like guilt and shame, or slowed promotion. These features give rise to optimal contracts with “empty promises” and endogenous supervision structures. Agents optimally make more promises than they intend to keep, leading to the concentration of supervisory responsibility in the hands of one or two agents.
A theory of disagreement in repeated games with bargaining
With Joel Watson
A contract-theoretic model of conservation agreements
With Heidi Gjertsen, Theodore Groves, Eduard Niesten, Dale Squires, and Joel Watson
Working paper 9/23/2010 (stay tuned for an updated version in fall 2011)
PermalinkNSF award on social networks
Nageeb Ali and I have been awarded a three-year grant from the National Science Foundation Economics Program, entitled “Enforcing Cooperation in Networked Societies.” Stay tuned for our first working paper soon, and lots of great projects to follow after that.
Robust collusion with private information
Published in The Review of Economic Studies, 2011.
Note: This is a major update of the paper formerly titled "Optimal ex post incentive compatible equilibria in repeated games of private information” and “The dynamic cost of ex post incentive compatibility in repeated games of private information."
Free-access link to published version
PermalinkSeveral papers under revision… Check back soon!
- Robust collusion with private information (Published 9/28/2011)
- A theory of disagreement in repeated games with bargaining (with Joel Watson, Updated 10/13/2011)
- Optimally empty promises and endogenous supervision (with Kareen Rozen, Updated 9/30/2011)
- Enforcing cooperation in networked societies (with Nageeb Ali)
Where to see me Spring 2010
This spring I'll be presenting seminars at the following universities near you:
• March 15: Università Bocconi, Milan• March 16: Collegio Carlo Alberto, Turin
• March 18: Universität Zürich
• March 23: European University Institute, FlorencePermalink
Enforcing cooperation in networked societies
With Nageeb Ali
Working paper coming soon
PermalinkAttainable payoffs in repeated games with interdependent private information
Note: Satoru Takahashi discovered an error in a previous version of this paper. I am working on figuring out how to correct it. For now, I am posting a shorter version that contains only the correct results. Please do not cite, circulate, or refer to any version of the paper dated prior to 2009.
Abstract: This paper proves folk theorems for repeated games with private information, communication, and monetary transfers, in which signal spaces may be arbitrary, signals may be statistically interdependent, and payoffs for each player may depend on the signals of other players.
NY Times on the Dot-Com bubble, with lessons for today
The New York TImes published a nice article today on David Kirsch and the Dot-Com Archive that he curates at the University of Maryland. The article briefly mentions a paper that David, Brent Goldfarb, and I published in the Journal of Financial Economics a few years ago. As the article mentions, our paper interprets the Dot-Com bubble as a strategy gone wrong—too many startup firms adopted "Get Big Fast" strategies (trying to emulate Yahoo!, Google, eBay, and Amazon), when they would have had better success targeting smaller niche markets.
However, the article does not mention that our paper also makes a broader contribution to the theory of investment bubbles and crashes in general—one that can help us interpret more recent events in markets like residential housing, public equities, and mortgage backed securities. The basic insight is that straightforward herding behavior among the relatively well-informed financial fund managers (like venture capitalists, hedge funds, and investment banks) can lead to a boom-bust cycle because these intermediaries are managing the funds of less informed investors (like pension funds, institutional investors, and individuals). A herd forms among the fund managers when enough of them decide that a certain kind of security or asset is a good investment that the rest find it optimal to "pile on" without investigating the fundamentals any further. Such a herd can be temporary and self-correcting, as the fund managers learn about the investment over time. However, investors on the outside, like you and me, don't know as much as the people we hired to manage our funds, and we don't fully trust them either because they're not playing with their own money. What Brent, David, and I showed in the paper is that once a bubble starts to pop, we (the investors) may find it optimal to withdraw our funds entirely, just as our fund managers have corrected their strategies to account for the collapse of the bubble.
In the current financial crisis, we can see these kinds of effects, as banks raise their interest rates and collateral requirements, investors "flee to quality" and seek refuge in treasury securities, and investment banks fail one after another. To make these ideas concrete in the context of a current crisis, we can think of AAA-rated corporate bonds (rather than equity shares in Dot-Com startups) as the overvalued security, mutual fund managers (instead of venture capitalists) as the well-informed intermediaries, and blindly trusting the bond rating agencies (rather than Get Big Fast) as the misguided strategy. According to our theory, once we see corporate bonds starting to crumble, we investors can find it optimal to withdraw from the corporate bond market in favor of Treasury bills, even though our mutual fund managers are learning to do a better job gauging the default risk of bond-issuing firms.
What does it take to get the market started again under this theory? We investors need to see some evidence that the financial intermediaries are investing wisely again. An infusion of government equity into the financial industry may help, if it gives the intermediaries a chance to demonstrate that they can be trusted once again. Otherwise we can get stuck in a bad equilibrium in which nobody invests because the intermediaries haven't demonstrated that they are trustworthy, and the intermediaries can't demonstrate that they are trustworthy because nobody is investing. So the theory suggests that the kinds of financial bailouts currently underway might actually be useful.
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