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The Action Value of Information and the Natural Transparency Limit*
Marc-Andreas Muendler
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Current draft: Sep 5, 2005 First draft: May 27, 2000 |
University of California, San Diego
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abstract
Add an opening stage of signal acquisition to a canonical portfolio choice model and let investors have rational expectations about the ensuing Walrasian equilibrium. The expected marginal utility of a signal (its action value) falls in the number of signals and turns strictly negative at a finite number because signals diminish the asset's excess return. There is a natural transparency limit at which rational investors pay to inhibit information disclosure. Prior to the limit, financial information is a public good and justifies intervention. To instill more transparency, cutting costs of information acquisition is superior to disclosure because disclosure crowds out private information acquisition and risks a violation of the transparency limit.
keywords: Information acquisition; portfolio choice; rational expectations equilibrium; informational efficiency; transparency
jel: G14, D81, D84
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